EDO Principal Correspondence Control

FROM:

DUE: 10/22/02

EDO CONTROL: G20020584

DOC DT: 10/08/02

FINAL REPLY:

Edwin S. Lyman

Nuclear Control Institute

TO:

Chairman Meserve

FOR SIGNATURE OF :

** PRI **

CRC NO: 02-0653

Chairman Meserve

DESC:

ROUTING:

OI Report No. 3-2001-059, Security Incident at

Perry Nuclear Plant

Travers

Paperiello

Kane Norry Craig

DATE: 10/10/02

Burns/Cyr Caputo, OI

ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT: CONTACT: Dyer, RIII

NSIR

Zimmerman

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

Coordinate with OI.

Templato: SECy-017

E-Rids: SECy-01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET

Date Printed: Oct 09, 2002 12:27

PAPER NUMBER:

LTR-02-0653

LOGGING DATE: 10/09/2002

ACTION OFFICE:

EDO

AUTHOR:

Edwin Lyman

AFFILIATION:

NCI

ADDRESSEE:

Richard Meserve

SUBJECT:

Concerns the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) Report No. 3-2001-059, security incident at

the Perry nuclear plant in Ohio

ACTION:

Signature of Chairman

DISTRIBUTION:

RF, SECY to Ack

LETTER DATE:

10/08/2002

ACKNOWLEDGED

No

SPECIAL HANDLING:

OCM #12159

NOTES:

Commission Correspondence

FILE LOCATION:

Adams

DATE DUE:

10/24/2002

DATE SIGNED:

NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE

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October 8, 2002

Honorable Richard A. Meserve Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Chairman Meserve:

I am writing to you on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) in reference to the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) Report No. 3-2001-059, dated September 26, 2002, involving a security incident at the Perry nuclear plant in Ohio.

In this report, which was publicly released yesterday on ADAMS, it is stated that an investigation by the OI initiated on December 28, 2001 substantiated that "a contract insulator deliberately falsified access authorization records by failing to disclose his complete criminal history" in applying for unescorted access at Perry. The letter states that NRC will not take any enforcement action against Perry's owner, First Energy Operating Company (FENOC) in response to this incident.

NCI requests that NRC provide answers to the numerous questions raised by this incident. Was this individual actually granted temporary unescorted access (TUA) based on false information? If so, for how long did it remain in effect? Did the individual enter areas of the plant where he or she could have committed sabotage or obtained information of use to external attackers? Was there any evidence that the individual had links to terrorism? Was the deception uncovered by an FBI background check or by some other means? And finally, would the "severe limitations on temporary unescorted access" that you claim NRC has imposed in its February security orders have prevented this security failure from occurring?

NCI has communicated with you more than once since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 to express our concern regarding NRC's practice of allowing nuclear plant licensees to grant TUAs to contract workers for extended periods based on self-reported information about their criminal histories. At least one similar security breach, at Duke Energy's Oconee plant, has come to light in the past thirteen months. The incident at Perry is yet another demonstration of the recklessness of this practice.

Strategies for scopping the spread and reverting the growth of nuclear arms.

פפוור באי מחרבשע בחווותר דותודותו א

Given that you have acknowledged in a September 6 letter to Homeland Security director Tom Ridge and other officials that "enhancing access control may be one of the most effective means of preventing a successful attack [on a nuclear plant], because an insider could provide significant assistance to an attacking force," NCI cannot understand why NRC continues to allow TUA to be granted in the post-September 11 era.

We once again urge NRC to forbid unescorted access to nuclear plant protected areas to individuals unless they have been cleared by FBI criminal background checks, as well as by more thorough investigations of non-criminal but suspicious behavior that may indicate involvement with terrorist activities. We also urge you to demonstrate your commitment to combating the insider threat, as articulated in your September 6 letter, by issuing enforcement actions when serious breaches of security like the one at Perry occur.

We look forward to your prompt reply. Thank you for your consideration of these important matters.

Sincerely,

St. Elm Skym Dr. Edwin S. Lyman

President